Exile, Return and Restitution in the Czech Republic by Vadura, Katharine A
 
Portal Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies Vol. 2, No. 1 January 2005 
ISSN: 1449-2490 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/portal/splash/ 
 
 
 
 
 
Exile, Return and Restitution in the Czech Republic 
 
Katherine Vadura, University of South Australia 
 
The period of development of a new state brings with it many experiences spanning the 
political, social and economic. The individuals and communities that make up the new 
state together forge a path that does not always run smoothly. The movement of people 
within the new borders and across borders is often a result of reactions to events both 
internal and external, and the resulting experiences can impact on people’s lives in very 
fundamental ways. The experience of exile, its causes and consequences, can shape the 
development of a state and change the course of history. The Czech Republic or 
Czechoslovakia as a newly created state in 1918 had in the relatively short span of about 
seventy years brought to the people residing within its territory a number of different 
experiences of exile. The focus of this paper is on the Sudeten Germans, a former minority 
in the Czech lands sent into exile at the end of World War 2, my specific interest being to 
analyse key periods in exile experiences between 1918 and 1995. The development of the 
relationship between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans still remains problematic in the 
eyes of many of the protagonists. Among the many questions raised by that relationship is 
whether this form of exile was a legislated banishment or a form of mere displacement. In 
addition, the question of guilt has arisen over the years, both as a mechanism for invoking 
the forced transfer of a population and also as a justification for receiving recompense. 
The conceptual basis for this paper centres on nationalism, identity politics and minority 
rights as an underlying framework for analysing the experience of exile of the Sudeten 
Germans and their complex relationship with the Czechs, in the attempts to establish a 
homeland. 
 
The end of the First World War brought with it many changes to the geo-political 
landscape of Europe. It resulted in the defeat and dismantling of empires, and gave 
independence and new international standing in the form of statehood to territories which 
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had previously been under their jurisdiction. The peace settlements after the war resulted 
in the creation of a number of new nation-states including Czechoslovakia. As the granting 
of statehood had been based on the right to self-determination according to the principle of 
nationality, a common problem for all of the newly independent states was the place of 
minorities. This extended to how to include or integrate these sometimes-reluctant 
minority groups into the new state framework. The German minority in the Czechoslovak 
state found itself to be part of a state that it had not wanted to join, and in a subservient 
position, a reversal of its previous majority status. 
 
The exile experiences in the Czech lands occurred after significant political upheavals that 
destabilised the institutions and structures of the state. These population movements 
occurred after the two world wars and also as a result of border revisions and regime 
changes, and they impacted on all nationalities in the new state. Similarly the experiences 
of return and restitution that flowed from the various exiles have also been varied in the 
post-war and post communist periods. 
 
What is the relevance of the metaphor of guilt for exile? 
 
The struggle between two of the nationalities that had co-existed in the territory of the 
former Czechoslovakia and resulted in various experiences of exile, produced a cyclical 
effect which in this paper is represented by the metaphor of guilt. Guilt represents a 
metaphor for the consequences and implications surrounding the pursuance of particular 
actions. As Barkan states, ‘guilt is a potentially powerful mechanism for transforming 
daily sentimentality and universal humanitarianism into a political agenda’ (2000, 316). In 
the example discussed in this paper, the political agenda manifests itself in a discourse on 
restitution.  
 
One community’s guilt may have been another community’s freedom, but freedom brings 
with it new guilt. This new guilt stems from an entrapment in the past. Following the end 
of World War II, Karl Jaspers (1967) discussed and debated the question of German guilt 
surrounding the war, and the concept of collective guilt. Guilt can arise by virtue of being 
part of a particular national group. This means that there is a degree of responsibility for 
the wrongs committed by that group simply for being a member of that group. Therefore 
freedom can only be achieved by taking or acknowledging responsibility and then acting 
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accordingly, by restitution or the making up for wrongs. All national groups participate in 
this cycle, which is self perpetuating until all parties acknowledge their responsibility 
(both collective and individual). The act of acknowledgment is the first step in the process 
of freedom towards achieving purification or reconciliation. True freedom and breaking of 
the cycle at the national level can only be achieved if authority is handed over to a higher 
body, a strong supporting argument for the development of the supranational institutions 
of today. According to Jaspers, purification through restitution is the only way to achieve 
freedom from any form of guilt.  
 
Background to exile – the Sudeten German dilemma 
 
War and conflict proved to be a consistent backdrop to developments between the Sudeten 
Germans and the Czechs. Change, in the sense of historical change, was inevitably a 
catalyst for dramatic solutions in the attempt to create an atmosphere of stability. The 
issues and questions surrounding the Sudeten Germans have remained true to this drive, 
and their appearance on the international stage as a minority has stood as testimony to 
their continued dissatisfaction. The peace conferences at the end of the First World War 
created a number of new nation-states out of what had been the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
of which the Czechoslovak Republic was just one. At the same time, those Germans who 
had lived scattered across the entire territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire remained as 
minorities in these new states. Thus, the Sudeten Germans were relegated to minority 
status with the formal recognition of the Czechoslovak Republic in October 1918. 
Depending on the structure of the new states, these German minorities were given either a 
greater or lesser political voice. In the case of the Sudeten Germans, whilst they were 
given political and human rights, they never attained the status of equal partners with the 
Czech population. The Czechoslovak Republic became one of the new states that 
consisted of a patch work of nationalities, of which the Sudeten Germans formed the 
single largest minority, comprising a population that was larger by one million than the 
Slovak population in the Republic. The conception of the state in this form presented an 
increased probability of it falling into a situation of instability primarily as a result of the 
size of the Sudeten German group and their dissatisfaction with not achieving equal status 
or the right to self determination. In relation to the notion of identity politics, this 
representation of a multi-ethnic state raised significant questions concerning the feelings 
of belonging of all the groups that found themselves to have a minority status. As 
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Campbell says, both the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans had a similar view of nation and 
homeland. However, when the right to self determination was not granted to all national 
groups, in becoming a minority the Sudeten Germans found themselves in a situation of 
competing loyalties, where the nation and the homeland were not congruent (Campbell 
1975, 75-76). The foundation for the first phase of the cycle of guilt and freedom had been 
laid. 
 
In summary, the Czech and Slovak peoples were successful in their united bid for self 
determination and the creation of their own nation-state. The Sudeten Germans had 
miscalculated on the interests of their German neighbours, and the subsequent reaction of 
the Allies. The Sudeten Germans had attempted to explore a number of avenues by which 
to also achieve self determination, including committing themselves to becoming a part of 
Greater Austria, and on another occasion to joining the German Reich, which had been 
met with disinterest on the part of Germany. Therefore, to all intents and purposes the 
question of international recognition of the right to self determination for the Sudeten 
Germans was resolved, in that it was denied, and the beginnings of a sense of exile inside 
a new state developed. The only remaining option was for this minority to work within the 
confines of the new state and attempt to seek some form of right to autonomy through the 
available democratic channels.  
 
Munich Agreement and a new experience of exile 
 
September 1938 was to prove to be the deciding month both for the future of the First 
Republic of the Czechoslovak state and for the fate of the Sudeten Germans. Time was 
clearly running out for the Czech head of state Eduard Beneš, and all attempts at 
negotiation to settle the tensions and growing conflict with the Sudeten Germans had 
failed. The fate of the Czechoslovak state seemed to rest with the benevolence of Hitler 
and the combined strength of Britain and France. When Hitler demanded the return of the 
Sudeten territories to the Reich at this time with the open threat of war, the appeasement 
policy of Britain prevailed and the British and French governments agreed on a proposal 
that allowed for the transfer to Germany of certain Sudeten territories where the German 
population made up more than fifty percent of the total population. The Czechoslovak 
government, and in particular Beneš, found this most objectionable, especially since they 
had always upheld the idea that they would not tolerate the international community 
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meddling in their domestic affairs. Thus, they found the proposal to be unviable and 
rejected it, a move that angered both Britain and France to the point where they threatened 
to renege on the terms of their alliance. Only the Soviet Union promised to stand by the 
Czechoslovak Republic and send assistance should the country come under any direct 
threat. This promise was not binding in that the Soviet Union, under the terms of its treaty 
with the Czechoslovak Republic, was only obliged to assist if France interceded first.  
 
When it became clear that Czech isolation was complete and peace had been maintained, 
Hitler opted to again push with further demands, this time in relation to disputed border 
claims by Hungary and Poland. Hitler set the deadline of October 1, 1938, for the return of 
the Sudeten lands, after which he proclaimed decisions about new borders could be made. 
The use of the idea of return in itself tapped into the issues of identity and belonging that 
had been left unresolved from the Sudeten point of view. In a final attempt to avoid war, 
both Britain and France sent separate requests to Hitler to negotiate. Finally, on September 
28 Hitler agreed to a conference with Britain, France and Italy. When the leaders of the 
four countries arrived in Munich the next day, the result of the conference was already a 
forgone conclusion; Hitler’s demands would be met at the expense of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, which importantly was missing from any of the negotiating process. The 
Sudeten Germans were considered to be represented de facto by Hitler, as he had been the 
architect of the Munich crisis. On September 30, the Munich Agreement was finalised and 
accepted. The terms of the agreement saw all of Hitler’s demands realised; the occupation 
of the Sudeten territories would be completed in five stages, a transfer of the Czech 
population would take place over the following six months, and all Sudeten German 
prisoners being held for political offences were to be released (Kral 1964, 336). This 
heralded a new phase of exile experiences in the Czech lands. 
  
The Munich Agreement was received with jubilation on the part of most Sudeten Germans 
and with great sadness on the part of the Czechs. The repercussions of the Munich 
Agreement were to be felt for many years by the Czechs, both in the anger and hostility 
harboured against the Sudeten Germans and in their sense of abandonment by their allies. 
The latter feeling was particularly skilfully used by Czech nationalists and advocates of 
pan Slavism during and after the war. The lack of Czechoslovak representation at the 
Munich conference resulted in the Munich Agreement being referred to as a diktat by the 
Czechs - the future of their state was being decided by external issues, in the sense of 
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European and international security and political goals, and they were denied any 
opportunity to defend their state. The Munich Agreement resulted in a frenzy of claims 
against the Czechoslovak state from all sides: Germany regained its oppressed German 
minority; Poland revived its claim to the disputed Tešin region; Hungary eagerly sought to 
regain the border villages that had become part of Slovakia in the post-war carve up after 
the Treaty of Versailles. Czech bureaucrats struggled in an up hill battle in giving adequate 
attention to all the claims, while at the same time trying not to aggravate the situation in 
case more territory were lost. The resentment created by the Munich Agreement was so 
strong that it permeated all future foreign policy negotiations, directly in relation to 
Germany, and indirectly in relation to other European powers. Munich thus marked the 
end of the First Republic, and the ensuing Second Republic was short lived and followed 
by occupation and war.  
 
For many Czechs the Sudeten Germans represented a so-called fifth column, a disloyal 
minority vis-à-vis the state, nation and homeland, and a group that deserved to be 
expelled. This idea was in many ways a continuation of thought that had already existed at 
the time of the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic. As the state had been established 
on the principle of nationality, an inherent tension between loyalty to the state and to the 
nation and homeland existed for those not of the Czech majority. After Munich, Beneš felt 
‘that when Czechoslovakia … managed to recover her historic borders there would have to 
be a ‘radical and final’ solution of the German minority problem’ (Cornwall 1992, 185). 
 
The impact of Munich and the politics of exile 
 
It must be remembered that not all of the Sudeten Germans supported the Munich 
Agreement, or participated in post Munich jubilation or the subsequent occupation of the 
Czech lands. Many of the Sudeten German Social Democrats found themselves in a 
situation where they were persecuted and sent to concentration or labour camps for their 
anti-Hitler stance. In the Czech lands, the Sudeten German Social Democrats had a 
difficult time, and were consistently let down by the Czech government. Many of them, in 
fact, were turned over to the Nazis by the Czechs as anti-fascists. The Czechs sent 20,000 
Sudeten Social Democrats, who had fled to the Czech lands in search of safety, back to the 
Sudeten German territories. Only 3000 of the Social Democrats made it to exile in 
England (Prinz 1995, 73).  
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By October 7, 1938, the Nazis occupied the four border areas outlined in the Munich 
Agreement. A policy of transfers was drawn up to ensure that those Czechs were removed 
from there, setting a precedent for the use of expulsion as a means to establish ethnic 
homogeneity in a particular territory. Beneš remained president for only a short time after 
the conclusion of the Munich Agreement. He left the Czech lands on October 22, ending 
up in Britain where he was persuaded to take up the position of leader in exile (Paneth 
1943, 90). By 1940, a government was formed out of the National Committee, and Beneš 
was elected as its President. Other former members of the Czechoslovak Parliament who 
had fled the country rose to prominence in the new government in exile.  
 
Politically active members of the Sudeten Germans communists also fled to London, 
where Wenzel Jaksch, a social democrat, came to be known as one of the more outspoken 
members of the Sudeten German community.1 Therefore, a semblance of democracy was 
created by the formation of an opposition, which on the Czech side included the former 
prime minister and leader of the Agrarians, Milan Hodza, as well as the Sudeten Germans 
in exile. However, due to fundamental differences in belief, the Sudeten Germans in exile 
found themselves unable to present a unified stance, a factor that would further destabilise 
their position in the future Czechoslovakia. The war years for Beneš and the rest of his 
government in exile were spent focussed on the restoration of the Czech state by lobbying 
for the annulment of the Munich Agreement and finding a lasting solution to the minorities 
problem. Beneš was ultimately successful in lobbying for recognition of his government as 
the free Czechoslovak government. Importantly for the fate of the Sudeten Germans, it 
was from his position in exile that he proceeded to draw up his plans for the post-war 
Czechoslovak Republic, one without minority issues. For the Sudeten Germans there was 
a further division between the followers of Jaksch who fought against the calls for 
expulsion, and those Sudeten Germans who became a part of Beneš’s inner circle and 
supported his plans for post-war Czechoslovakia. 
 
 
                                                 
1 In discussions between Jaksch and Beneš in early 1939 it was clear that a resolution to the Sudeten 
German question needed to be found. Jaksch at this point in time still felt confident that a post-war multi-
national state would be established, along the lines of the earlier proposed Swiss model. (Vondrová 1994, 
19, Doc. 4). 
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During the period of the Protectorate in the Czech lands there was only one constitutional 
element that remained free; the presidency in exile. Beneš was the holder of this office, 
and the argument followed that as his resignation after Munich came about as a result of 
external pressure, his presidency was invalid. That said, Beneš nonetheless ‘became the 
obvious leader and focal centre of Czechoslovak democracy as reconstituted abroad’ 
(Taborsky 1945, 148). Beneš was determined not to make what he considered to be the 
same mistake again, namely to rely on the western powers for assistance. Munich had 
convinced him of the futility of pursuing such action. The idea of western patronage had 
failed, and this lead to his decision to choose a new patron with the feeling that a Slavic 
link might prove more reliable. Therefore, the Czech government in exile proceeded to 
conclude several important treaties with the Soviet Union. The Košice Program 
established a new policy in relation to questions of identity and belonging in the redefined 
state. As the war drew to a close, Beneš and his cabinet followed one of his ministers 
Němec back to the liberated regions of Czechoslovakia from Moscow (Roucek 1948, 369). 
 
Solving the minorities problem in the Czech lands 
 
Attempts at restoring the balance in the post-war state were focussed on implementing a 
lasting solution in relation to the perceived problem of a disloyal German minority. The 
pursuit of ethnic homogeneity by eliminating or removing the unmanageable minority, in 
this instance through transfer, had the end goal of creating more favourable conditions for 
the majority Czech population. From the Czech side there were a number of justified 
reasons for pursuing their policy of ‘removing’ the minorities problem. Shortly after the 
Munich episode, Beneš had decided that if there was to be any stability in the future state, 
a solution would have to be found to the minorities problem, as he held the Sudeten 
Germans almost solely responsible for the destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic. In 
1939 Beneš presented an idea for this solution. This idea was based on a system of cantons 
(župa), which had already been debated in the 1920s. The importance of this idea lay in 
the fact that these cantons would be ethnically or nationally homogenous (Cornwall 1992, 
186). 
 
On the other hand, Czech nationalists were in favour of a far more radical solution to the 
Sudeten problem, preferring a radical cleansing of the Czech lands of all ethnic Germans 
after the war. Through their influence Beneš adopted the expulsion solution with regard to 
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the Sudeten problem, a solution for which he spent the majority of the war years 
attempting to gain international acceptance. After 1941, Beneš was no longer making any 
reference to the introduction of a canton system. The years during the war were then spent 
trying to come up with an equitable expulsion solution. The idea of expelling or 
transferring an unwanted population was not a new one. An international precedent for the 
transfers was found in the 1920s post-war treaty allowing for an exchange of populations 
between Greece and Turkey. The rationale for the Potsdam transfers was established 
despite the fact that at the time it was felt that the principle of transfer as a means of 
solving a minority problem should not be repeated: the resulting trauma was not worth the 
net gain (Macartney 1996). The process of gaining international approval for the expulsion 
of the Sudeten Germans thus took several years. This also meant that it was no longer 
possible for the Sudeten Germans and Czechs to work together in exile, and the Sudeten 
German Social Democrats embarked on a mission of protest against the expulsion idea. 
However, the harshness of Nazi rule in the Czech lands led to a lack of sympathy for the 
Sudeten Germans in the international arena.  
 
In May 1941, Beneš made his first public speech in Britain advocating a solution to the 
Sudeten problem by way of population transfer. The following year Beneš proceeded to 
pursue the expulsion solution, only this time he raised the guilt criterion. The idea was 
initially rejected by the Allies, but by the end of the war they too had accepted the idea 
(Cornwall 1992, 189-92). Therefore, in the early 1940s the dialogue was changing from 
what sort of a solution to implement to how many Sudeten Germans should be expelled in 
order to maintain internal stability in Czechoslovakia after the war had ended.  
 
The idea of redrawing Czech borders with Germany, and thereby reducing the German 
population in the Czech lands, was again proposed, just as it had been in 1918 and 1919. 
However, by the end of 1943 Beneš was being advised by a Molotov deputy ‘simply to 
chase the Germans out without ceding any territory’ (Cornwall 1992, 188). Beneš 
maintained that ideologically the Sudeten German problem was a fight on a global scale 
between democracy and totalitarianism; therefore the expulsion was equated with moral 
restitution. In opposition to this, Jaksch questioned how the expulsion of solely the 
Sudeten Germans could be justified on the basis of collective guilt/collective responsibility 
if the Slovaks were also not expelled. This argument was based on the premise that the 
Slovak population was just as responsible for the post-Munich break up of the state. To 
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this argument, Beneš responded by saying that 80 percent of the Slovaks had not 
abandoned their loyalty to Czechoslovakia (Prinz 1995, 79-81). Beneš openly expressed 
the justification for territorial transfers to be grounded in the principle of guilt, in 
particular, the collective guilt of the German minority in the destruction of the 
Czechoslovak state and that minority’s collaboration with Hitler. He then had to decide to 
what degree the concept of guilt should be applied: to all Sudeten Germans or only to 
those who were confirmed Nazis.2 
 
The implications of the Beneš Decrees 
 
One of the more controversial decisions of the government in exile under Beneš was to 
enact a set of decrees. In Košice the now provisional government released its new 
program, the important points of which related to the expulsion and denationalisation of 
the Sudeten Germans and the confiscation of their property, unless they could prove their 
loyalty to the Czechoslovak state. This program was made into law, thus legitimising what 
has come to be known as the Beneš Decrees. Due to the recognition of the continuity of 
the office of the President in exile, the decrees passed by Beneš were converted into law 
after the war when the provisional National Assembly took on its executive role in the 
liberated Czechoslovak state. The Assembly then passed a constitutional law in March 
1946, which converted all of President Beneš’ decrees into law. The two most 
controversial decrees passed by Beneš, in relation to the Sudeten Germans, were those 
concerning the loss of citizenship and the confiscation of property (ČTK, Feb. 17 1995, 
40).  
 
 
                                                
In this context, the Czech communists started to push strongly for the expulsion of the 
Sudeten Germans. From their point of view such a stance could only be of benefit to their 
party and its popularity as an antithesis of Nazism and right-wing politics. Subsequent 
programs of nationalisation were a direct result of the desire to move as far away as 
possible from the extreme right-wing politics and policies of the war years, and the fact 
that these programs also resulted in Germans losing their property was regarded popularly 
as an added bonus. Also, aside from the Sudeten Germans, there was a population of 
 
2 Beneš was warned by Anthony Eden about the potential dangers of apply the principle of guilt to the 
expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, as a restrictive mechanism in relation to the number of transferees 
(Zeman 1991, 209). Also see Doc. 148, 23 November 1944, ‘Memorandum of the Czechoslovak government 
on the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia’ (Vondrová 1994, 303-8). 
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Reichsdeutsche in the Czechoslovak Republic that numbered approximately 100,000 
people. All people of German nationality found themselves in a reverse situation to that 
had applied at the time of the Protectorate. Now the Germans were given less rations than 
the Czechs and were forced to wear armbands bearing the letter ‘N’ for Němec (German)3. 
The months immediately after the war were particularly strained as small areas of Nazi 
resistance remained in the region. Added to this, some of the Czechs who had returned 
from German concentration camps were appointed to positions of authority from which 
they were able to vent their feelings of hatred against the Sudeten Germans and succeeded 
in fuelling Czech nationalism. Czechs who had been expelled from their homes in the 
Sudeten regions after the Munich agreement started to return to the region, along with 
looters and other revenge seekers. This brought about a situation of frontier justice; many 
loyal Sudeten Germans found themselves at the mercy of a mob sanctioned by the Interior 
Ministry under the control of the communists. Some moderate members of the Beneš 
government attempted to avert the impending disaster, but with no success. The Czechs 
remained convinced that the Sudeten Germans still had, and were pursuing, their agenda 
of undermining the state.  
 
Wild expulsions and organised transfers 
 
The Potsdam Peace Conference did not initiate the idea of transferring or expelling the 
German population from the countries of Eastern Europe. Rather, it merely gave Allied 
approval to a measure that was already taking place. When Beneš returned to Prague in 
May 1945, he publicly announced his program for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. 
In many ways, this announcement sanctioned the start of the period that was known as the 
‘wild expulsions,’ which lasted until the autumn of 1945. The number of Sudeten Germans 
expelled from the Czechoslovak Republic came to about three million. The exact figures 
for the numbers vary according to the different studies undertaken on the Czech and 
Sudeten German sides. However, there is consensus that prior to the Potsdam Conference 
a significant portion of Sudeten Germans were either expelled as a result of the ‘wild 
expulsions,’ or fled the country ahead of the liberating armies. When the Potsdam 
 
                                                 
3 As a result of the introduction of the Beneš Decrees many of the rights and freedoms previously 
experienced by Sudeten Germans as citizens were removed (Die Sudetendeutschen 1995, 152). 
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Conference put an end to the ‘wild expulsions’ there were some 800,000 fewer Sudeten 
Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic than at the time of the Munich Agreement.4 
 
At the Potsdam conference it was agreed that the borders of Germany would revert to 
1937 boundaries, and that the Sudeten regions claimed by Germany at Munich would 
revert to the Czechoslovak state. The conference also outlined a policy for the settlement 
of German refugees, and accepted the transfer of the German minorities from the 
Czechoslovak Republic, Poland and Hungary (Grenville 1987, 224). In ending the ‘wild 
expulsions’ the Potsdam Conference thus sanctioned a more orderly transfer of the 
Sudeten German population. The allocation of these expellees was divided up in the 
following way: Soviet zone: 750,000 from Czechoslovakia and 2,000,000 from Poland, 
British zone: 1,500,000 from Poland, American zone: 1,750,000 from Czechoslovakia and 
500,000 from Hungary, and French zone: 150,000 from Austria (Bauer 1995, 89). As far 
as the Czechs were concerned the most important decision was Allied recognition for the 
expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. However, the Conference also deemed that the 
expulsions should be stopped until the required infrastructure could be established in the 
occupied zones in Germany (Wiskemann 1956, 110). The end of the forced expulsions 
thus brought to an end a particularly turbulent phase in the relationship between the 
Sudeten Germans and the Czechs.  
 
A lasting solution to the minorities problem – the initial post-war years 
 
The situation in the Czechoslovak Republic after the war was a difficult one. When the 
transfers of the Sudeten Germans were postponed, the Czechs took action to try and 
minimise the reaction of the Czech population. Several schemes were initiated, including a 
compulsory work scheme that was introduced in part to ensure that the economic situation 
was improved after years of German/Nazi usurpation. The Sudeten Germans who 
remained in the country were faced with three choices: to clear their names of any Nazi 
related activities; to contribute their specialised work skills to the Czech economy; or, for 
those who did not satisfy the first two options, internship in camps. The aim of the camps 
was to diffuse some of the tension in the community by removing the Sudeten Germans, 
 
                                                 
4 In this first wave of expulsions between 700 000 and 800 000 Sudeten Germans were removed from 
Czechoslovakia, of these 150 000 were sent to Austria and the others to Germany (Bundesministerium fur 
Vertriebene 1994, 112). 
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and to serve as collection centres for those who were to be expelled (Zeman 1991, 122; 
Schmidt-Hartmann, 1996).  
 
The integration of the German refugees and expellees into Germany took place over a 
four-year period after the war, from 1945 to 1949. The experiences and integration 
processes of these people varied according to where they came from and where in 
Germany they ended up. The fate of the expellees who ended up in the Soviet occupied 
zone of Germany differed from those in the Western occupied zones. Some 1.75 million 
Sudeten Germans, the largest group, ended up in the American zone, while approximately 
750,000 had originally been sent to the Soviet zone a number of these people later fled to 
West Germany (De Zayas 1988, 101). 
 
The largest number of Sudeten Germans found themselves in Bavaria (Bauer 1995, 199-
215), part of the American zone. At first they received a cool reception as many Germans 
felt that they had helped to bring about the war in Europe. Also, the arrival of so many 
ethnic Germans became a highly visible reminder of having lost the war (Kuhn 1989, 
177). This perception was not improved by the Sudeten Germans’ cultural traditions, 
which were seen to be fundamentally different to those of the existing German population. 
Many Sudeten Germans found themselves having to adapt to a reformulated identity, one 
that would provide them with a semblance of belonging. Others were extremely resentful 
of the loss of cultural characteristics that for them were representative of their identity, for 
example their dialect. This view was taken to great lengths by some of the Sudeten 
Germans who were opposed to mixed marriages, seeing themselves as ethnically distinct 
from the Germans of their host society (Larres et al. 1996, 40-41). Although ethnically 
German, these Sudeten Germans had evolved as part of Austria, in a different national 
environment, and regarded themselves as members of a group with a distinct history and 
culture, and a distinct nationality. Some Sudeten Germans felt that it was their patriotic 
duty to resist any attempts at integration, as this might be interpreted as giving up on 
claims to their right to self-determination.  
 
It was not until 1947 that the first expellee policy in the occupied zones was adopted, 
which allowed for ‘uniform integration and implementation procedures on a zonal rather 
than a state or local basis’ (Schoenberg 1970, 45). Following this the American authorities 
established special advisory boards at all legislative and administrative levels to oversee 
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refugee and expellee affairs. The membership of these boards consisted of equal numbers 
of West Germans and expellees. The developments in this area took place over a number 
of years. The Marshall Plan was to play a useful role in 1948 in these developments, given 
that ‘the authorities of the Plan made nearly sixty million dollars available exclusively for 
the needs of German expellees and refugees’ (Paikert 1962, 24). 
 
Grosser raises the point with regard to the integration of the expellees that in the case of 
Germany, the term integration was not synonymous with assimilation. The reason for this 
was that if the government were to try and assimilate the expellees it might be seen to be 
admitting or recognising the Oder Neisse border, thus effectively putting an end to calls 
for the return of the homelands of the expellees. This terminological distinction was also 
supported by the Landsmannschaften, associations of ethnic Germans from Central and 
Eastern Europe, who saw that it was to their own political advantage if the government 
pursued this line of reasoning (Grosser 1978, 274). Again, these positions iterate how each 
of these expellee groups perceived that they had their own distinct national identity. They 
felt that assimilation would negate this sense of national belonging and would result in 
their inability to make future claims for self-determination on the grounds of being distinct 
nations. 
 
The path to normalisation of relations between Czechs and Sudeten Germans 
 
From a Czech point of view, even prior to the communist coup of 1948, concerns were 
being raised in the government about the potentially divisive nature of the Sudeten 
Germans abroad, thereby making the process of normalisation of relations a difficult one. 
Toward the end of the 1960s, at the time when West Germany was seeking to re-establish 
relations with Czechoslovakia, and with the signing of the Prague Treaty (1973), the 
Sudeten Germans commenced a vigorous program of lobbying for their perceived rights 
and for recognition and upholding of the rights of ethnic Germans remaining in 
Czechoslovakia.  
 
The situation in West German politics in normalising relations with the countries of 
Eastern Europe, and in particular Czechoslovakia, followed a different path to that taken in 
relation to East Germany. The main reason for this was the influence of the expellees and 
refugees who had been able to gain a political voice. Specifically, the Sudeten German 
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problem for West Germany was the fact that they had inherited the border problems as a 
legacy of Hitler’s Germany and of the Munich Agreement. Therefore, on behalf of the 
expellees, including the Sudeten Germans, West Germany demanded their right to a 
homeland. These demands led other countries, both from the west and east, to interpret 
these calls as a means for Germans to return to the territories from which they had been 
expelled. Following from this, fears were raised that once such populations had re-instated 
themselves by way of self determination, they would be able to re-include themselves into 
the territory of Germany. Thus, the development of West Germany’s Ostpolitik was 
hampered not only by internal party politics disputes but also by external perceptions. 
Thus, the main source of contention between the Czechs and the Germans, including the 
Sudeten Germans, were the legacies of Munich. West Germany was still the only state not 
to recognise the Munich Agreement as invalid, and the Sudeten Germans in Germany were 
determined not to allow the German government to recognise its invalidity.  
 
From the point of view of the Sudeten Germans the Prague Treaty left unresolved the issue 
of their right to their homeland and to self-determination, two inalienable human rights 
that could not be relinquished. The Sudeten German Landsmannschaft in Bavaria 
continued to maintain that the treaty would ultimately fail, as it had not been concluded 
with their direct participation. The Landsmannschaft proceeded to use this argument to 
reassert their influence when post-1989 negotiations started between Germany and 
Czechoslovakia for a new treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness. The old issues 
that were debated during the negotiations surrounding the Prague Treaty resurfaced once 
again. This time, however, they were further complicated by the Czechoslovak restitution 
laws that were introduced with a cut-off date of 1948. Change in the political sphere 
ushered in the potential for renewed attempts at reconciliation; however the process of 
achieving this goal was not to be a simple one, and had an impact on the exile experiences 
of many people. 
 
Czechs after 1989 and restitution 
 
For the Sudeten Germans, the changes underway in Czechoslovakia after 1989, in an 
atmosphere of democracy, signalled a potential opportunity for a redress of their 
grievances and potential reconciliation, especially given that so many changes and new 
legislation were being introduced. This period brought to a forefront in a Czech forum the 
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many issues that the Sudeten Germans had been discussing in Germany in the post-war 
years and were now able to discuss openly in their former homeland. However, the 
fundamental elements of the Sudeten question remained unresolved during this period 
despite continued negotiations and the signing of a new treaty of friendship between the 
two states in 1992. The new era of reconciliation was to leave many Sudeten Germans 
disappointed as it focussed on the future with nothing more than a verbal acknowledgment 
of past injustices. The situation after the Velvet Revolution, and the fact that 
Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Republic, modelled themselves closely on the First 
Republic, rekindled old fears and grievances on both the Czech and German side in 
relation to the Sudeten Germans. These fears were on several occasions exacerbated by 
Sudeten German associations based in Germany. Whilst the Munich Agreement was 
nullified, issues concerning the Beneš decrees and their possible negation, and questions 
regarding restitution were very much alive.  
 
In Germany, the Sudeten community was still adhering to its long established policies on 
reconciliation and restitution, in place since the post-war expulsions. From the Sudeten 
point of view, the signing of a new friendship treaty between the Czechs and Germans 
presented an opportunity for their grievances to be redressed. This feeling was encouraged 
by developments in Czech politics in the area of coming to terms with the past, with the 
new government attempting to right the wrongs of the previous regime. The principles put 
forward by the Sudeten Landsmannschaft were comprised of the following: a renunciation 
of retribution and revenge for the events surrounding the expulsions: a claim for restitution 
of all losses that had resulted from the expulsions; a claim that their homeland be returned 
to them; and a claim that they had a legitimate right to pursue self determination 
(Blumenwitz 1985, 117-18). The last two claims had existed since the establishment of the 
first Czechoslovak republic. The process by which the Czechs tried to deal with these 
unresolved questions from the past is central to the reconciliation debate. That debate has 
been marked by the development of a new political relationship between the Germans and 
the Czechs on a state level, and by the discussions of the moral dimensions of the Sudeten 
case at a Presidential and intellectual level. The reconciliation process remained divided 
between the intellectual push towards a dialogue and the populist approach to the problem. 
However, there would seem to a common viewpoint on the Czech side that the Sudeten 
Germans were victims of their own actions and therefore not entitled to participate in the 
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restitution process. The isolation of the Sudeten Germans in the form of a lack of external 
support delegitimised their claims (Barkan 2000, 140-41).  
 
In January 1991, the German government decided to avoid any questions relating to 
compensation or ownership in the treaties to be concluded with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Negotiations for the treaty with Czechoslovakia commenced in March. 
This was followed by a statement by Czech Premier Petr Pithart to parliament that 
property confiscated prior to 25 February 1948 would not be returned, in accordance with 
the Czechoslovak restitution law. At the same time, it was announced that there would be 
no rescinding of the Beneš decrees by any Czechoslovak government. Both policies came 
under question by the Czech media and politicians, and inspired strong lobbying by 
various Sudeten German organisations. However, the Czech government has stood firm on 
both policies. Despite occasionally giving out contradictory statements and fighting a case 
in the Constitutional Court against the Beneš decrees, no changes in policy have been 
made. In treaty negotiations the Czechoslovak foreign ministry conceded that it would 
accept a zero option where no property claims would be made by either side; however it 
insisted that this would in no way affect Czechoslovak claims for compensation by victims 
of Nazism. By September 1991, when a draft of the treaty had been prepared, the Sudeten 
German Landsmannschaft (through its spokesperson Franz Neubauer) spoke out strongly 
against this document, stating that Sudeten Germans grievances were not addressed, 
namely restitution of property and right to homeland, and again calling for direct talks 
between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak government. Despite this dispute, 
finally in February 1992 the Czechoslovak-German treaty on ‘Good Neighbourly 
Relations and Friendly Cooperation’ was signed in Prague. The treaty was ratified by the 
Czechoslovak Federal Assembly on April 22, and by the Bundestag on May 20 and the 
Bundesrat on June 26, 1992.  
 
Restitution and return 
 
Following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe there was widespread feeling that 
the wrongs committed by the previous regime needed to be corrected as a means of 
dealing with the past. Many countries, Czechoslovakia included, chose to adopt various 
forms of restitution legislation as a means of redressing grievances against the old regime. 
Restitution became a political mechanism for ensuring some form of negotiated justice. In 
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the countries in transition during the 1990s, the restitution process promised a fast route to 
capitalism and privatisation, with the benefit of establishing economic viability and a 
stable state (Barkan 2000, xxxiv, 112). Restitution has been defined in the following way: 
‘one way among others to transfer state-owned assets to private holders of property titles 
on the basis of rights’ (Offe et al. 1993 30). On one level states saw restitution as a means 
to simply return property to private ownership, a way of reversing one of the pillars of 
communist ideology. However, restitution also raised questions about whether such a 
practice was in itself not creating further moral wrongs: ‘any attempt to compensate for 
known wrongs will only move us from one morally objectionable situation to another’ 
(Sher 1993, 38). Wrongs were defined as actions that resulted in the removal of 
fundamental rights, liberties and freedoms from citizens.  
 
Political theorists also turned their discussion to the fact that by correcting the moral 
wrongs of the past, restitution laws were also simultaneously shaping the national 
identities of the new states in the early post-communist period. For Avineri, the restoration 
of rights occurred only in a specific historical context that, in turn, circumscribed the 
conditions of restitution and reparations. Not only was restitution law a victory of norms 
of private property over communist ideology and practice, it was also a means of 
constructing a post-communist national identity (Avineri 1993, 35). Holmes has raised the 
question that if together economic and moral arguments against restitution seem 
unbearable, why is the process continuing? Approaching the debate from the standpoint 
that the concept of restitution is morally unjust, he concludes that it is good policy if such 
a cleansing process will assist in the establishment of a new democratic system (Holmes 
1993, 33). 
 
In the case of the Sudeten Germans, however, the problem was not a matter of simply 
identifying the victims. In a collective sense this was easily recognised, but on an 
individual level it was slightly more difficult, as it required distinguishing between distinct 
levels of guilt (or innocence). This posed a dilemma in much the same way as that faced 
by Czechs in relation to dealing with communist collaborators and the choices presented in 
the lustration law. There were also the additional questions of to what extent should 
property be restituted and where should the cut off point be. Although ‘Compensation for 
losses presupposes proof of loss’ (Offe et al. 1993, 25), it is obviously easier to provide 
proof in some cases like confiscation or imprisonment than in cases like ill-health or loss 
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of opportunity stemming from displacement; a situation exacerbated because 
documentation required for proof can be difficult to obtain. Many questions must be 
tackled and resolved if any form of reconciliation process is to be achieved between those 
who are perceived to have done wrong and those who have been wronged, as can be 
summed up by the following statement: ‘the discourse of restitution aims at the morally 
possible, not at the politically utopian’ (Barkan 2000, 349). 
 
The process of correcting past wrongs generated great debate and deliberation in 
Czechoslovakia after the Velvet Revolution. The resulting series of rehabilitation and 
restitution laws sought to provide some recompense for injustices committed by the 
communist regime. From a Czech government perspective the main rationale for adopting 
any form of restitution legislation was simply to put into place a mechanism for returning 
property into private ownership. On the one hand, this would reverse the program of 
nationalisation that had been implemented by the previous regime. On the other hand, 
restitution was also seen as being the fastest, and most direct, way of re-establishing 
private ownership (Jezek 1997, 482). A concern on the part of several politicians was that 
returning property to its original owners might slow the privatisation process down, due to 
potential legal controversies resulting from questions of ownership or inheritance rights. 
However Havel, as president, was consistently a strong supporter of the restitution 
legislation and its aims to achieve ‘historical justice’ while ‘not slow[ing] down or 
hinder[ing] the country’s radical economic reforms’ (Bren 1994, 18). 
 
The process of legislating for the return of property to private ownership, and the system 
of restitution did not occur in one simple step. In fact a number of laws passed in 1990 and 
1991 related to the issue of restitution, and several laws concerned with the privatisation of 
industry by the voucher method were also introduced. After the division of 
Czechoslovakia, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia inherited the restitution laws and 
the legal framework that had been previously established. In the Czech Republic, the focus 
of the restitution debate soon turned to the Sudeten Germans, as well as to the restitution 
of Jewish property and that of the former nobility.  
 
Yet, while the large restitution law did ensure that many people received compensation, it 
did not include those who had had their property confiscated prior to February 1948. The 
cut-off date in an otherwise generous restitution law was chosen to preclude the Sudeten 
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Germans from claiming back their property, as did the new citizenship and residency 
requirements enshrined in the legislation, which made the process difficult for emigrants. 
It should be pointed out that all political parties were in agreement over this legislation, 
with some even wanting to prevent the Sudeten Germans from returning to the country. In 
relation to émigrés and the restrictions placed on them by the restitution laws, changes to 
the act came after a long drawn out process of lobbying. Amendments made to this large 
restitution law in subsequent years included the restitution of property confiscated prior to 
1948 to those Germans who had remained in Czechoslovakia, for example spouses of 
Czech citizens, and those who had been affected by the confiscations. After 1948 these 
people had Czech citizenship, but not their property, returned to them (Bren 1994, 20).  
 
By May 1994 there was renewed pressure on the Czech government to start a dialogue 
with the Sudeten Germans. This coincided with discussion of rescinding the Beneš decrees 
(Kohler 1995, 6), which was initiated by a Czech of German origin, Rudolf Dreithaler, 
who lodged a petition in the Czech Constitutional Court. His petition sought principally a 
re-examination of the constitutionality of Beneš decree no. 108, concerned with the 
confiscation of property from disloyal minorities (Pehe 1994, 12). The reconciliation 
process between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs during the genesis period, and 
attempts at dealing with the different exile experiences, thus seemed to become focused on 
one issue, the debate over restitution versus compensation (Kubes 1995, 3). The debate 
again confirmed that despite the post-World War Two Czech Government’s attempt to 
secure a lasting solution to the ‘disloyal’ minority of the Sudeten Germans in the form of 
their expulsion, the result would be a long-lasting stalemate between calls for restitution 
on the Sudeten side, and calls for compensation on the Czech side.  
 
The return of the old ghosts of exile experience 
 
In March 1995, the Czech Constitutional Court made a significant decision in relation to 
the Sudeten question by rejecting the abolition of Beneš Decree 108 (confiscation of the 
enemy's property and on nation restoration funds). Also, German opposition parties started 
to urge the Bundestag to take decisive action on the matter of compensation for Czech 
victims of Nazism, and to make a government statement on bilateral relations. 
Reconciliation between the Czechs and Sudeten Germans seemed to reach a tense standoff 
when discussions became focussed on righting past wrongs, namely providing 
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compensation for damages sustained by individuals both during and after the war. One of 
the central truths of the debate appeared to be that remedies sought to rectify injustices of 
the past inevitably lead to emotional debates and cries of further injustices. The euphoria 
of 1989 and the subsequent transition to a free market resulted in the adoption of many 
new laws attempting to change or redress the so-called wrongs of the previous communist 
regime. The split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 was in itself a peaceful one; however in 
relation to the Sudeten German question a new storm started to brew; namely, the issue of 
restitution of property confiscated after the war, and the right to return. The question of 
restitution was in itself a controversial one, given the implications it held for 
acknowledgement of Sudeten German grievances. At the centre of the controversy was the 
fact that, since 1989, the Czech government had consistently expressed the view that the 
return of property to the former Sudeten German minority was out of the question.  
 
The year 1995 was to mark a turning point in the road towards reconciliation and dialogue 
between the Czech Republic and Germany over the Sudeten question, although still not 
directly with the Sudeten Germans. In a speech in May that year, Premier Klaus expressed 
his regret at the injustices suffered by the Sudeten Germans after World War II. He called 
for a rapprochement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs, but also made the 
point that success would rest very much on the attitude of Czech politicians (ČTK Press 
Reports, 1995). At that point in time both governments had reached consensus on one fact, 
namely that they would not allow nationalist sentiments to hamper developments in 
Czech-German relations. This was again a significant step forward, and to all intents and 
purposes marked the end of this phase of the cycle of guilt and freedom in relation to the 
varied experiences of exile in the Czech lands. 
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